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In recent years there has been a growing interest in environmental and social issues on the part 
of a variety of corporate stakeholders including investors, employees, suppliers, customers, 
government, and the wider society. In line with this trend, a considerable body of academic 
research has focused on examining the various stakeholder related implications of a firm’s 
actions aimed at addressing its corporate environmental and social responsibility, generally 
referred to as CSR. Scholars have found investments in CSR to be associated with a number of 
benefits, including superior economic performance (see Beurden and Gossling, 2008, for a 
recent literature review) and reduced firm risk (see Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001, for a meta-
analytic review). In the latter context, scholars to date have tended to view a firm’s investments 
in CSR as a risk management strategy that can provide an insurance-like protection for its cash 
flows, reducing their riskiness vis-à-vis the market (see Godfrey, 2005) and thus impacting the 
firm’s financial/systematic risk (see Hasseldine et al., 2005; Jo and Na, 2012; Oikonomou et 
al., 2012). There is also, however, a view in the literature that investments in CSR-related 
activities that help build good relations with a firm’s stakeholders are like a real option that a 
firm can use to reduce its operational costs and/or input prices thus reducing the firm’s 
operational i.e. idiosyncratic risk (Husted, 2005). This theoretical view however has not been 
explicitly tested in the literature although there is some indirect empirical evidence supporting 
this view (see Lee and Faff, 2009). Moreover, while the link between corporate social 
performance and financial risk has been examined to some extent, corresponding studies related 
to environmental (E) and social (S) disclosures are lacking. Our paper attempts to address both 
these gaps.  
Increasingly public limited companies around the world are making extensive (i.e. 
covering a wide number of relevant issues, cf. Clarkson et al. 2008) and objective (i.e. ‘hard’ 
quantified and hence more reliable, cf. Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier and Magnan, 2013) 
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environmental (E) and social (S) disclosures. In line with this trend, academic studies have also 
been conducted to investigate various capital market implications of such disclosures. While 
there is an ongoing debate in the literature as to whether extensive E disclosures relate to 
superior environmental performance (see Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cho 
and Patten, 2007; Guidry and Patten, 2012; Patten, 2002), evidence to date suggests that 
extensive and objective, hence implicitly reliable, E (and S) disclosures reduce the information 
asymmetry between the firm and its investors (Cormier et al., 2009). Such E disclosures are 
also found to be associated with lower implied cost of capital (Orens et al., 2010); and with 
improved informational context of the firm enabling analysts to make better earnings forecasts 
(Cormier and Magnan, 2013, 2014). Recently, Qiu et al. (2016) find that firms making more 
extensive and objective E and S disclosures and particularly S disclosures enjoy higher market 
values. They however find this relation to be driven by the higher expected growth rates in the 
cash flows of such firms rather than by a reduction in the cost of equity capital for such firms 
(as prior evidence seems to find, cf. Orens et al., 2010). Thus, a relevant question to ask is 
whether such disclosures also reduce a firm’s risk and if so, which measure of risk is impacted, 
i.e. systematic and/or idiosyncratic i.e. operational risk. From a stakeholder theory perspective, 
studying the relation between E and S disclosures and both measures of risk is important. First, 
systematic risk may prima facie matter only (or mostly) for corporate investors, but as socially 
responsible investment continues to grow around the world, ceteris paribus, evidence of lower 
systematic risk enjoyed by firms making greater E and S disclosures can help direct more funds 
to firms seen as being socially responsible as well as promote corporate transparency. 
Moreover, as more firms publicly reveal what they actually do in terms of their CSR, this can 
promote environmentally and socially responsible business practices and their reporting in 
companies around the world. Second, if extensive and objective E and S disclosures are 
associated with lower firm operational/idiosyncratic risk, consistent with RBV theory (Hart, 
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1995), these would be reflective of reputation and trust building activities on the part of the 
corporation with its key stakeholders like employees, suppliers, customers, etc. This finding 
would also provide support for Husted’s (2005) assertion that investments in CSR (which we 
presume would also include investments in CSR-related disclosure) to be a real option that can 
help a firm reduce its operational risk. Stakeholders, particularly employees, suppliers, and 
managers with their human and/or financial capital directly tied to the operational success of 
the firm would benefit from reduced firm operational or idiosyncratic risk. In this paper we 
directly test the link between a firm’s E and S disclosures and both measures of risk.  
Employing a panel data set of UK listed firms covering the years 2005-2013, we find a 
negative and significant association between a firm’s E and S disclosures and its idiosyncratic 
but not with its systematic risk. We find these results to hold even after controlling for the firm’s 
environmental and social performance. These findings are of relevance for all corporate 
stakeholders, in particular those who have their tangible and intangible assets tied to the 
fortunes of the firm, such as its employees, suppliers, customers and managers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the prior literature and 
develops the testable hypotheses; Section 3 discusses the sample, variables and models; Section 
4 presents the results; and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Environmental and social disclosures and firm systematic risk  
A considerable body of academic research has investigated various financial implications of a 
firm’s corporate social performance, CSP, including the link between CSP and measures of 
corporate financial performance, CFP (e.g. Brammer et al., 2006; Beurden and Gossling, 2008; 
Dowell et al., 2000), between CSP and a firm’s cost of capital (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008), 
as well as between CSP and a firm’s systematic risk (e.g. Jo and Na, 2012; Oikonomou et al., 
2012; Salama et al., 2011). Overall this body of research suggests that better CSP tends to be 
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associated with better financial performance and also lower overall cost of capital. The link 
with systematic risk however is less than clear – while Salama et al. (2011) and Oikonomou et 
al. (2012) find a relatively weak negative link between CSP and systematic risk, Jo and Na 
(2012) find a strong negative link between CSP and systematic risk. It is worth noting though 
that Jo and Na’s study is limited to only the ‘controversial’ industries, that is, those that are 
socially undesirable, where CSR may particularly help play a positive role in improving firm 
image among investors.  
In terms of E (and at times S disclosures) while there is still an ongoing debate as to 
whether extensive E (and S) disclosures reflect superior E (and S) performance (see Al-Tuwaijri 
et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cho and Patten, 2007; Guidry and Patten, 2012; Patten, 
2002), emerging evidence appears to suggest that objective and extensive E and S disclosures 
are beneficial. For example, Qiu et al. (2016) find a positive link between combined E and S 
and particularly S disclosures and a firm’s market value. Cormier et al. (2009) find such 
disclosures to reduce the information asymmetry between the firm and its investors, while 
Cormier and Magnan (2013 and 2014) find such E disclosures to also reduce the information 
uncertainty faced by financial analysts, allowing them to make better earnings forecasts. 
Finally, Orens et al. (2010) find web-based non-financial disclosures to be linked with lower 
implied cost of equity capital.  
Few studies to date have directly examined the link between a firm’s E and/or S 
disclosures and its systematic risk. Moreover, the studies which do examine this link tend to 
treat systematic risk as an independent variable explaining a firm’s E and/or S disclosures (cf. 
Hasseldine et al., 2005; Toms, 2002). The theoretical motivation for this empirical treatment is 
also not clearly articulated in these studies.  
In this study, based on clear theoretical motivation, we examine the impact of a firm’s 
E and S disclosures on its systematic risk. The theoretical argument for examining the link is 
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developed as follows. First, according to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), investors 
benefit from extensive and objective corporate disclosures. Second, according to proprietary 
costs theory (Dye, 1985), disclosures are more reliable when there are proprietary costs 
associated with them (e.g. regulatory costs such as environmental fines in the context of E 
disclosures or commercial costs e.g. threat to competitiveness due to disclosure of 
environmental innovation information, sensitive employee health and safety plans and 
practices, etc.). Third, managers are more likely to make more extensive and objective 
disclosures if they perceive the potential benefits of such disclosures to exceed their costs (as 
per voluntary disclosure theory, VDT, Verecchia, 1983 and 2001). Finally, prior theoretical 
arguments (Hart, 1995) and empirical evidence show that more extensive and objective 
voluntary corporate disclosures, including E and S disclosures, have been associated with a 
number of corporate benefits (discussed earlier) including reduced information asymmetry 
between firm and its investors and analysts (Cormier et al., 2009; Cormier and Magnan, 2013) 
and lower implied cost of equity capital (cf. Orens et al., 2010). Thus, in the light of this 
theoretical motivation and the supporting empirical evidence, we hypothesize that (stated in 
alternative form):  
H1: Extensive and objective E (and S) disclosures are negatively related to a firm’s systematic 
risk. 
2.2. Environmental and social disclosures and firm idiosyncratic risk 
As per agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) shareholders are assumed to be the only 
corporate stakeholders to have an incomplete contract with the firm and accordingly are 
assumed to be the only residual risk bearers of a firm. However, scholars (e.g. Asher et al., 
2012) drawing on the property rights theory, the stakeholder theory, and numerous real world 
examples, have argued that stakeholders other than shareholders (e.g. employees, bank 
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borrowers in the recent crisis, customers, and suppliers) also have incomplete contracts with a 
firm and accordingly are also the residual risk bearers of a firm. In fact, employees with their 
undiversified human and financial capital tied to the firm can be easily argued to be among the 
biggest losers if a firm collapses. Hence, stakeholders other than shareholders have a significant 
stake in a firm’s continued operational success and hence care about its idiosyncratic or unique 
business risk. Accordingly, as per agency theory and instrumental stakeholder theory (cf. Jones, 
1995), stakeholders would prefer to transact with a firm with higher transparency and lower 
operational risk. The recent financial crisis and its continued aftermath provide enough 
evidence to make a compelling case for firms to follow operational strategies that increase 
corporate transparency and reduce their idiosyncratic risk. Making extensive and objective E 
and S disclosures can be seen as an integral part of a firm’s business risk reduction strategy for 
a number of reasons discussed below.  
First, studies drawing on the resource based view of the firm, i.e. RBV theory, have 
theoretically argued and empirically found that reliable E disclosures, by influencing 
perceptions about the firm, contribute to building a positive firm reputation (Hart, 1995; 
Hasseldine et al., 2005; Toms, 2002). Such positive perceptions can contribute significantly to 
reducing a firm’s reputational risk (Heal, 2005). Second, one can argue that such reporting by 
promoting corporate transparency and building trust with a firm’s economic stakeholders can 
help reduce the transactional/operating risk arising from potential distributional conflicts with 
a firm’s stakeholders (ibidem). For example, objective reporting of product stewardship 
practices, fair remuneration and training policy and practices, good working 
conditions/environment for employees, human rights policy, and reporting of corporate equality 
and diversity policies and practices, etc. can minimize the risks of distributional and hence 
operational conflicts with a firm’s key economic stakeholders. Consistent with such arguments, 
Qiu et al. (2016) find that firms which make extensive and objective E and S disclosures tend 
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to enjoy higher expected growth rates of their cash flows. Cheng et al. (2014) also find that 
firms making higher CSR related disclosures face lower idiosyncratic capital constraints and 
better access to finance, due to enhanced corporate transparency. Finally, Husted (2005) argues 
that investments in CSR (which we assume would also include costly investments in CSR-
related disclosures), are real options involving strategic and operating decisions by managers 
that can help reduce business risk of the firm.  
Thus based on prior relevant theoretical arguments (Hart, 1995; Heal; 2005; Husted, 
2005) and related empirical evidence (Cheng et al., 2014; Qiu et al., 2016), we expect that 
extensive and objective E and S disclosures should also be associated with reduced firm 
idiosyncratic risk.1 Accordingly we hypothesize that (stated in alternative form): 
H2: Extensive and objective E (and S) disclosures are negatively related to a firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk. 
3. Sample, variables and models 
3.1 Sample 
Table 1 presents a description of our sample. While the total number of observations available 
for Bloomberg E and S disclosure scores (used for measuring the disclosures in our study and 
discussed in detail below) is 1,835 firm-years, matching it with financial variables collected 
from Datastream leaves a usable sample of 1,755 firm-year observations covering the period 
2005-2013. Based on the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), the Bloomberg 
sample represents the following 8 industry sectors (with proportion of total sample presented 
in brackets): construction industries (3.92), financial sector (18.53), manufacturing (26.95), 
                                                 
1 While we do not have a specific hypothesis for the link between E and S disclosures and total risk of the firm as 
measured by stock volatility, for comparability of results with prior relevant studies (e.g. Jo and Na, 2012) we also 
test this link.  
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mineral industries (10.95), retail trade (10.90), service industries (14.71), transportation and 
communications (10.95) and wholesale trade (3.43). Thus our sample covers a wide cross-
section of industries (see Table 1, Panel A). 
3.2. Variables 
The financial variables used in our analyses are obtained from Datastream, including the data 
used to calculate total, systematic and idiosyncratic risks, the three dependent variables used in 
our analyses. Environmental and social disclosure scores, the main explanatory variables are 
collected from Bloomberg. In our robustness test, we also use the Thomson Reuters Asset4 
environmental and social performance scores retrieved from Datastream. Appendix A describes 
the variables, their measurements and sources in detail. 
3.2.1. E and S disclosure scores 
The primary explanatory variables of interest in this study are the E and S disclosure scores of 
companies developed by Bloomberg. Bloomberg assigns E and S disclosure scores to 
companies based on data points collected via multiple sources including annual reports, 
standalone sustainability reports and company websites etc. The data points used for calculating 
E and S disclosure scores are based on the GRI framework and capture standardized cross-
sector and industry-specific metrics. The weighted score is normalized to range from zero, for 
companies that do not disclose any E and S data, to 100 for those disclosing every data point 
collected. Moreover, within each E and S category, the individual company score is expressed 
as a percentage, so as to make the score comparable across companies. The score is also tailored 
to be industry relevant, so that each company is evaluated only in terms of the data that is 
relevant to its industry sector. For example, ‘Phones Recycled’ is only considered in the score 
for telecommunications companies and not for other sectors. Similarly, ‘Gas Flaring’ only goes 
into computing the disclosure score for oil and gas exploration and production companies while 
12 
 
companies in other sectors are not penalized for not disclosing it. The data points are also 
weighted (based on a proprietary weighting scheme) in terms of importance within each 
category, so that ‘Green House Gas emissions’ for example would be weighted more heavily 
than other data points within the environment category. Hence, the disclosure scores are both 
relevant as well as weighted in terms of importance to their users (particularly investors). These 
thus capture the quantity (i.e. number of data points reported by a company) but more 
importantly the quality (in terms of objective and industry-relevant data points) of E and S 
disclosures. A number of prior CSR-related studies have used Bloomberg disclosure scores 
(e.g. Eccles et al., 2012; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015; Qiu et al., 2016; Utz and Wimmer, 2014). 
A short description of data points covered in each score is discussed below. The complete list 
of the data points covered under the E and S categories is given in Appendix B. 
The ‘E’ score covers various types of environmental information that could broadly be 
classified as ‘hard’ items and ‘soft’ items. ‘Hard’ items include quantifiable data like 
Carbon/GHG emissions, energy/water consumption, waste recycled, investments in 
sustainability, and ISO certification, among others. ‘Soft’ items include firms’ environmental 
policies and initiatives such as waste reduction policy, energy efficiency policy and green 
building policy, among others. Approximately 80% of environmental disclosure items covered 
are ‘hard’ objective data items, while only 20% are ‘soft’ data points. Thus, these environmental 
scores largely capture what Clarkson et al. (2008) would call a firm’s ‘hard’ environmental 
disclosure. As mentioned earlier, Cormier et al. (2009) find such ‘hard’ disclosures to be more 
strongly associated with reducing the information asymmetry between the firm and its 
investors; while Cormier and Magnan (2013) find such relevant, objective and reliable 
disclosures help analysts make better earnings forecasts.  
The ‘S’ score developed by Bloomberg mostly covers reporting of issues related to 
employee relations, such as employee health and welfare, as well as their training and 
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development including training in CSR. The ‘S’ score also covers disclosure of issues of 
equality and diversity in employment, community spending and human rights. Based on the 
type of information covered, about 70% of social score is based on ‘hard’ items while ‘soft’ 
information makes up about 30% of the score. Such ‘hard’ S disclosures are also likely to 
enhance a firm's social legitimacy, its social reputation and as Cormier et al. (2009) find, help 
reduce the information asymmetry between the firm and its investors.  
3.2.2. Measures of financial risk 
Following prior literature, a firm’s total risk is measured by the standard deviation of the firm’s 
daily stock’s return (cf. Jo and Na, 2012). Furthermore, we use the CAPM beta as the measure 
of a firm’s systematic risk (Jo and Na, 2012) and estimate it by regressing the daily stock return 
on the daily market return of the FTSE-350 over the year:  
Rit = αi+ βiRmt+ei (1) 
where Rit is the return on security i for day t, αi is the intercept term, βi is the systematic risk of 
security i (BETA), Rmt is the return on the market m for day t and ei is an error term.  
Finally, we measure a firm’s idiosyncratic i.e. unique business risk as the standard deviation of 
residuals from CAPM based on daily stock returns (cf. Amit and Wernerfelt, 1990; Lee and 
Faff, 2009). 
3.2.3. Control variables 
 Following prior related studies, we control for a number of variables that can affect the 
individual firm’s risk. First, to discern the marginal effect of E and S disclosures on risk, 
following Qiu et al. (2016), we control for the firm’s E and S performance in the corresponding 
equations. Consistent with Jo and Na (2012), we expect a negative link between E or S 
performance and all measures of risk. E and S performance scores are provided by Asset4, a 
Thomson Reuters database (used by prior literature, e.g. Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015; Shaukat 
14 
 
et al., 2015). In addition, we control for firm size (SIZE) as measured by the natural logarithm 
of total assets. We expect a negative relationship between size and firm’s risk. Prior studies 
suggest that large firms are less exposed to risk, as they are more able to manage risk especially 
in times of high volatility (e.g. Jo and Na, 2012). We also control for investment opportunities 
as measured by market to book ratio (MTB). It is argued that firms with low growth 
opportunities are characterized by low share prices and low market to book ratios (e.g. 
Lewellen, 1999). Moreover, analysts consider firms with poor perspectives of growth (low 
MTB ratio) as being more exposed to market volatility (e.g. Bouslah et al., 2013; Lewellen, 
1999). Hence, we expect a negative relationship between risk and MTB. Leverage (LEV) is 
measured by total debt to total assets ratio. Prior evidence suggests higher leverage to be 
associated with higher firm risk (Abdelghani, 2005). Thus a positive association is expected 
between firm’s leverage and risk; profitability is measured by return on assets (ROA). Prior 
research finds more profitable firms to be less risky (e.g. Jo and Na, 2012). Following prior 
studies we also control for capital expenditure scaled by total assets (CAPEX) and asset growth 
(ASST_GROW) as measured by total assets in year t minus total assets in year t-1 divided by 
total assets in year t-1 (cf. Jo and Na, 2012; Salama et al., 2011). We include industry and year 
fixed effects in all models. Finally, in our robustness checks we employ governance 
performance score, GOV_PER, provided by Asset4. 
3.3. Model specification 







	 	  
(2) 
In Equation 2, Firm riskit is one of the risk measures, namely stock volatility, systematic risk 
(i.e. beta), or idiosyncratic risk. Disclosure scoreit represents E or S disclosure score, and the 
control variables are defined above. All regressions are run as random-effect panel data models.  
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 (Panel B) provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. It shows 
that the mean value of stock volatility is 0.350, and the average systematic risk is 0.979 (which 
is approximately equal to one, the value of the market beta), and the average firm specific risk 
is 0.019 (which is in line with values in prior studies, e.g. Amit and Wernerfelt, 1990). With 
respect to E and S disclosure scores, it can be seen that the S disclosure has a mean score of 
33% and E disclosure of 22%. This suggests that on average our sample of firms make more 
extensive S disclosures (as also found by Qiu et al., 2016). With respect to performance 
however, the average E performance score is almost equal to the average S performance score 
(about 66.6%). The average MTB ratio is 2.375. Average size measured as natural log of total 
assets is 14.928 (i.e. about £3,041 million). The average leverage and ROA are 21.2% and 9.7% 
respectively. Capital expenditure over total assets (CAPEX) and asset growth (ASST_GROW) 
are 4.5% and 15.0%, respectively.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Table 2 presents the pair-wise Pearson correlations for all variables. It shows a high 
correlation between total risk (i.e. volatility) and systematic (0.44) and idiosyncratic risk (0.95). 
16 
 
Moreover, the correlation between total and idiosyncratic (but not systematic) risk and E and S 
disclosure scores are negative and significant. Finally, weak correlations between the control 
variables indicate that our models are unlikely to suffer from multicollinearity problems. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Multivariate analyses 
Table 3 reports results from estimating Equation (2). Models 1-2 report results from regressing 
stock volatility on E and S disclosures and control variables. We find that the coefficients on E 
and S disclosures are negative and statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
This suggests that extensive and objective E and S disclosures help increase firm transparency, 
reduce information asymmetry and, by building trust and confidence between the firm and its 
investors, reduces its stock’s volatility. The results are also economically significant: one 
standard deviation increase in the E and S disclosure scores reduces stock volatility by 0.0077 
and 0.0091, respectively (i.e. by 4.81% and 5.66% of the corresponding standard deviation of 
the volatility variable).  
We then run the same regressions by replacing stock volatility with systematic risk 
(Models 3-4) and idiosyncratic risk measures (Models 5-6). In terms of systematic risk, we find 
that the coefficient estimates on E and S disclosure scores are statistically insignificant. It 
appears that E and S disclosures do not affect significantly the firm’s systematic risk. On the 
other hand, in Models 5-6, when the dependent variable is the idiosyncratic risk, it is clear that 
the coefficients on E and S disclosures are negative and statistically significant at the 10% and 
5% level, respectively. It appears that the reduction in stock volatility among high disclosure 
firms is mainly due to a reduction in the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. The results are also 
economically significant: one standard deviation increase in the E and S disclosure scores 
reduces idiosyncratic risk by 0.0005 and 0.0006, respectively (i.e. by 5.07% and 6.85% of the 
corresponding standard deviation in the idiosyncratic risk variable).  
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One might argue that the relationship between E and S disclosures and measures of risk 
is found only because the disclosures are a proxy for the companies E and S performance 
measures. Table 3 shows that it is not the case: the negative effect of E and S disclosures on 
measures of risk holds after controlling for the respective measures of E and S performance. 
This confirms that the disclosure about a firm’s E and S practices is of value in itself. 
Furthermore, the negative and significant coefficients on E and S performance scores are 
consistent with expectations and previous findings (e.g. Benlemlih and Girerd-Potin, 2014; Jo 
and Na, 2012). 
Additionally, we document several significant relationships between our measures of 
risk and the control variables used in the study. First, our results show that firm’s size is 
positively related to systematic risk and negatively related to total and idiosyncratic risks. 
Second, firms with high leverage are more risky, possibly because of high leverage being 
associated with higher default risk. Third, the coefficients on firm’s profitability (ROA) load 
negatively and statistically significantly (at the 1% level) for all the three measures of firm’s 
risk (total, systematic, and specific risks). This result suggests that more profitable firms are 
less risky. Fourth, companies with higher capital expenditures (as proxied by CAPEX) tend to 
have lower total and idiosyncratic risk although this effect is not fully robust across model 
specifications. Finally, other control variables such as MTB and ASST_GROW appear to be 
less likely to affect firm’s risk. Taken together, the results from the control variables are largely 
in line with previous relevant studies including Jo and Na (2012) and Salama et al. (2011). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2. Additional analyses 
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our main findings using instrumental variables 
approach to address the endogeneity issue and additional controls to rule out potential omitted 
variable biases that could affect our results. 
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There is a suggestion in the literature that a firm’s CSR-related activities and its risk 
could be endogenous (Jo and Na, 2012), perhaps being simultaneously determined by some 
omitted variable such as the firm’s management quality or by E and S performance (cf. Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008 and 2011). Hence, without correcting for potential 
endogeneity, our results could be biased. To mitigate against such a possibility, we follow the 
arguments of Cormier and Magnan (2014) who find that E and S disclosures are related to 
corporate governance performance (as disclosures and good governance could be seen as 
substitutes). We therefore instrument E and S disclosures with governance performance, 
GOV_PER (as provided by Asset4, a Thomson Reuters database) and other exogenous 
variables explaining the risk measures employed. We then re-estimate panel-data regressions 
reported above employing the aforementioned instrumental variable approach. The 
corresponding estimates are reported in Table 4 below. While the results obtained here are 
somewhat weaker than those reported in the main part of the paper, we still find that more 
extensive and objective S disclosures help firms in reducing their idiosyncratic risk (cf. Model 
12). We do not observe the same effect for E disclosures anymore, possibly because S 
disclosures are likely to be more relevant to key stakeholders (cf. Qiu et al., 2016). The effects 
of control variables are also weakened. In particular, neither E nor S performance indicators are 
significant in the amended model specifications. 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
We have also considered extending our basic model specifications to include a number 
of additional control variables shown to be relevant in the current context by some prior 
studies.2 In particular, while modelling firm risk Jo and Na (2012) control also for R&D 
                                                 




expenses and financial slack. Given that data on R&D expenditures is not available for more 
than 2/3 of our sample, inclusion of the corresponding variables (i.e. R&D scaled either by sales 
or by total assets) reduces the sample size considerably lowering the power of tests. Instead, we 
employ an alternative proxy, i.e. the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, and re-estimate all 
the regressions. While this new variable does not have a consistently significant effect on the 
risk measures, the main results of the paper are upheld. Similarly, while inclusion of the proxy 
for financial slack (i.e. the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets, cf. Qiu et al., 
2016) does not affect the conclusions of the preceding analyses, the variable itself is again 
insignificant.  
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we examine the link between E and S disclosures of UK listed firms and measures 
of firm risk, namely total, systematic and idiosyncratic risk. First, drawing on the agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the proprietary costs theory (Dye, 1985), and the voluntary 
disclosure theory (VDT, Verrecchia, 1983, 2001) we hypothesize that firms make extensive 
and objective E and S disclosures which by reducing the information asymmetry between the 
firm and its stock market participants, also reduce the firm’s systematic risk. However, we find 
no evidence to support this claim. This finding suggests that while extensive and objective (and 
hence reliable) E and S disclosures may help enhance a firm’s market value (as Cormier et al., 
2009, and Qiu et al., 2016, find), the effect may not be through a reduction in the firm’s 
systematic risk.  
However, our findings are consistent with Hart’s (1995) RBV theory based theoretical 
arguments and findings by Hasseldine et al. (2005) and Toms (2002) that extensive and 
objective E and S disclosures enhance a firm’s reputation. Our findings are also consistent with 
Qiu et al. (2016)’s RBV and VDT theory based findings that the gains from extensive and 
objective E and S disclosures (that potentially enhance a firm’s reputation among its key 
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stakeholders), come from real economic benefits like higher expected growth rates of the cash 
flows of such firms. Our findings complement Qiu et al.’s (2016) evidence, as we find such 
disclosures to also reduce a firm’s idiosyncratic or business risk. These findings are also 
consistent with Amit and Wernerfelt’s (1990) findings that firms operating in uncertain and 
risky environments, as most global firms do today, care about reducing their business risk. Such 
disclosures can thus be seen as part of the overall business risk reduction strategy of a firm. 
These findings further help in reconciling the legitimacy (e.g. Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
Patten, 1991) and economics based (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2008) arguments in the disclosure 
literature (cf. Cormier and Magnan, 2013). As long as extensive and objective E and S 
disclosures help promote corporate transparency and help mitigate the firm’s business risk, it 
probably does not matter whether these reflect (or not) superior E and S performance. Our 
finding that these disclosures matter for operational risk, even after controlling for a firm’s E 
and S performance further strengthen our assertion that such disclosures are of value in 
themselves. In this context, future research could examine whether CSP should be considered 
a contextual factor for CSD, i.e. whether reliable disclosures benefit firms with stronger CSP 
more (or less).  
These findings are relevant for all key corporate stakeholders having tangible and 
intangible assets tied to the fortunes of the firm, including its employees (having developed 
firm specific skills and competence and having their pensions tied to the continued success of 
the firm); key suppliers (having invested in intangible and tangible resources specifically for 
the firm); as well as managers (having human and financial capital tied to the firm). Our findings 
suggest that extensive and objective E and S disclosures by promoting corporate transparency 
can allow both firms and their stakeholders to make more informed economic decisions. 
While our study sheds some initial light on the link between E and S disclosures and 
firm risk, it probably raises more questions than it answers. Future research can fruitfully 
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explore these. One obvious avenue for future research is to explore more in depth the inter-
relations between E and S performance, disclosures and firm risk using more fine-grained and 
different measures of each variable. For example, in addition to the risk measures used in this 
study, future studies can employ alternative measures of risk such as option-based implied 
volatility measures or variability of accounting performance indicators. Moreover, as there is 
now a wide range of commercially available CSR indicators (mostly of CSP), future research 
can employ these in addition to those employed in our study. Importantly, the Bloomberg 
disclosure measures used here are geared towards a particular group of stakeholders, i.e. 
investors. If anything, this biases us against finding the result that we report. If other measures 
of CSP/CSD that better reflect the interests of other stakeholder groups are employed, the 
impact of CSP/CSD on business risk could be even more potent than reported in this paper. It 
might also be worth exploring the link between employee-related aspect of CSP, CSD, and firm 
operating risk, given the wider socio-political and of course the economic importance of this 
group of stakeholders in UK as in all countries (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995; Huselid, 1995). 
The effect of CSD might also be context-specific, e.g. social disclosures could bring more 
substantial economic benefits in labour-intensive industries.  
Examining the inter-links between E and S disclosures, firm risk, and financial 
performance over the longer run is also important as Orlitzky and Benjamin (2001) raise 
concern that actions that reduce firm business risk in the short run may promote complacency 
on the part of firms which may be detrimental to firm health in the long run. Alternatively, such 
actions may just be a sign of agile business management. Longer run study of these links would 
shed more light on these possible explanations. Moreover, while this study sheds light on the 
contemporaneous associations between E and especially S disclosures and firm risk, future 
research can examine the lead-lag aspects of this link using various market- and accounting-
based measures of risk (cf. Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). Future research should also explicitly 
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examine the specific channels through which CSD influences business risk, e.g. higher 
employee-relevant disclosures could boost employee morale and productivity, and thus boost 
operating performance and lower operating risk. 
Finally, E and S disclosures and their economic implications are also believed to vary 
by the institutional and regulatory disclosure-related settings. Future research can fruitfully 
examine the generalisability of these findings by testing these links in a multi-country setting 
that control for variations in institutional and regulatory disclosure environments.  
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Appendix A. Variables, definitions and data sources 
Variables Definition Source 
VOL Stock volatility measured as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in current year (annualized) Datastream
BETA Market beta (from CAPM) of individual stocks in current year, based on daily stock returns Datastream
IDIO Idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard deviation of residuals from CAPM based on daily stock 
returns 
Datastream
ENV_DISC Environmental disclosure score Bloomberg
SOC_DISC Social disclosure score Bloomberg
MTB Market value of assets over book value of assets Datastream
SIZE Firm size. It is the natural logarithm of total assets  Datastream
LEV Book value of total debt divided by total assets Datastream
ROA Return on assets Datastream




The evolution of total assets from year t-1 to year t to total assets in year t-1 
Environmental performance score 









Appendix B. E and S indicators with Bloomberg fields 
  
Environmental  
Direct CO2 Emissions DIRECT_CO2_EMISSIONS 
Indirect CO2 Emissions INDIRECT_CO2_EMISSIONS 
Travel Emissions TRAVEL_EMISSIONS 
Total CO2 Emissions TOTAL_CO2_EMISSIONS 
CO2 Intensity (Tonnes) CO2_INTENSITY 
CO2 Intensity per Sales CO2_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 
GHG Scope 1 GHG_SCOPE_1 
GHG Scope 2 GHG_SCOPE_2 
GHG Scope 3 GHG_SCOPE_3 
Total GHG Emissions TOTAL_GHG_EMISSIONS 
NOx Emissions NOX_EMISSIONS 
SO2 Emissions SO2_EMISSIONS 
SOx Emissions SULPHUR_OXIDE_EMISSIONS 
VOC Emissions VOC_EMISSIONS 
CO Emissions CARBON_MONOXIDE_EMISSIONS 
Methane Emissions METHANE_EMISSIONS 
ODS Emissions ODS_EMISSIONS 
Particulate Emissions PARTICULATE_EMISSIONS 
Total Energy Consumption ENERGY_CONSUMPTION 
Electricity Used (MWh) ELECTRICITY_USED 
Renewable Energy Use RENEW_ENERGY_USE 
Water Consumption WATER_CONSUMPTION 
Water/Unit of Prod (in Liters) WATER_PER_UNIT_OF_PROD 
% Water Recycled PCT_WATER_RECYCLED 
Discharges to Water DISCHARGE_TO_WATER 
Waste Water (Thousand Cubic Meters) WASTE_WATER 
Hazardous Waste HAZARDOUS_WASTE 
Total Waste TOTAL_WASTE 
Waste Recycled WASTE_RECYCLED 
Paper Consumption PAPER_CONSUMPTION 
Paper Recycled PAPER_RECYCLED 
Fuel Used (Thousand Liters) FUEL_USED 
Raw Materials Used RAW_MAT_USED 
% Recycled Materials PCT_RECYCLED_MATERIALS 
Gas Flaring GAS_FLARING 
Number of Spills NUMBER_SPILLS 
Amount of Spills (Thousand Tonnes) AMOUNT_OF_SPILLS 
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Nuclear % Total Energy NUCLEAR_%_ENERGY 
Solar % Total Energy SOLAR_%_ENERGY 
Phones Recycled PHONES_RECYCLED 
Environmental Fines # NUM_ENVIRON_FINES 
Environmental Fines $ ENVIRON_FINES_AMT 
ISO 14001 Certified Sites ISO_14001_SITES 
Number of Sites NUMBER_OF_SITES 
% Sites Certified %_SITES_CERTIFIED 
Environmental Accounting Cost ENVIRONMENTAL_ACCTG_COST 
Investments in Sustainability INVESTMENTS_IN_SUSTAINABILITY 
Energy Efficiency Policy ENERGY_EFFIC_POLICY 
Emissions Reduction Initiatives EMISSION_REDUCTION 
Environmental Supply Chain Management ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT 
Green Building Policy GREEN_BUILDING 
Waste Reduction Policy WASTE_REDUCTION 
Sustainable Packaging SUSTAIN_PACKAGING 
Environmental Quality Management Policy ENVIRON_QUAL_MGT 
Climate Change Policy CLIMATE_CHG_POLICY 
New Products - Climate Change CLIMATE_CHG_PRODS 
Biodiversity Policy BIODIVERSITY_POLICY 
Environmental Awards Received ENVIRONMENTAL_AWARDS_RECEIVED 





Number of Employees NUMBER_EMPLOYEES_CSR 
Employee Turnover % EMPLOYEE_TURNOVER_PCT 
% Employees Unionized PCT_EMPLOYEES_UNIONIZED 
Employee Average Age EMPLOYEE_AVERAGE_AGE 
% Women in Workforce PCT_WOMEN_EMPLOYEES 
% Women in Mgt PCT_WOMEN_MGT 
% Minorities in Workforce PCT_MINORITY_EMPLOYEES 
% Disabled in Workforce PCT_DISABLED_IN_WORKFORCE 
% Minorities in Mgt PCT_MINORITY_MGT 
Workforce Accidents WORK_ACCIDENTS_EMPLOYEES 
Lost Time from Accidents LOST_TIME_ACCIDENTS 
Lost Time Incident Rate LOST_TIME_INCIDENT_RATE 
Fatalities – Contractors FATALITIES_CONTRACTORS 
Fatalities – Employees FATALITIES_EMPLOYEES 
Fatalities – Total FATALITIES_TOTAL 
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Community Spending COMMUNITY_SPENDING 
Employee Training Cost EMPLOYEE_TRAINING_COST 
SRI Assets Under Management SRI_ASSETS_UNDER_MANAGEMENT 
# Awards Received AWARDS_RECEIVED 
Health and Safety Policy HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY 
Fair Remuneration Policy FAIR_REMUNERATION_POLICY 
Training Policy TRAINING_POLICY 
Employee CSR Training EMPLOYEE_CSR_TRAINING 
Equal Opportunity Policy EQUAL_OPPORTUNITY_POLICY 
Human Rights Policy HUMAN_RIGHTS_POLICY 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables of the study 
Panel A. Sample breakdown by industry 



















Panel B. Descriptive statistics  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median 
VOL 1,835 0.350 0.160 0.133 1.287 0.309 
BETA 1,835 0.979 0.291 0.255 2.344 0.977 
IDIO 1,835 0.019 0.009 0.007 0.073 0.017 
ENV_DISC 1,835 22.319 15.099 1.550 69.422 19.380 
SOC_DISC 1,835 33.449 12.986 3.509 84.211 29.822 
MTB 1,788 2.375 17.822 -39.46 19.68 2.290 
SIZE 1,834 14.928 1.858 11.069 21.596 14.551 
LEV 1,835 0.212 0.189 0.000 1.672 0.190 
ROA 1,805 0.097 0.100 -0.801 0.714 0.085 















SOC_PER 1,755 66.686 22.645 6.490 98.720 74.900 
GOV_PER 1,755 76.147 15.217 2.190 96.720 79.870 
This table shows descriptive statistics for the main variables of our study. Panel A presents the sample 
breakdown by industry. While Panel B provides the number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation, 























































































   
BETA 0.439 1.000 
 
   
IDIO 0.950 0.271 1.000 
 
   
ENV_DISC -0.113 0.149 -0.213 1.000 
 
   
SOC_DISC -0.092 0.161 -0.185 0.668 1.000 
 
   
MTB -0.055 -0.037 -0.039 0.028 0.012 1.000    
SIZE -0.057 0.289 -0.202 0.590 0.492 -0.010 1.000    
LEV -0.021 -0.028 -0.005 0.065 0.075 -0.051 0.054 1.000    
ROA -0.132 -0.127 -0.126 -0.088 -0.054 0.052 -0.281 -0.032 1.000    


























SOC_PER -0.191 0.076 -0.272 0.563 0.515 0.003 0.468 0.115 -0.047 -0.096 -0.042 0.697 1.000  
GOV_PER -0.169 0.064 -0.225 0.376 0.383 0.043 0.294 -0.006 -0.102 -0.070 -0.032 0.475 0.496 1.000 
This table presents Pearson pair-wise correlation between all the variables of the study. Correlation coefficients in boldface are significant at less than 5% level. 






Table 3. Environmental and social disclosures and firm financial risk 
Dependent variables Stock Volatility Systematic Risk (Beta) Idiosyncratic Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ENV_DISC -0.5106*  -0.1013  -0.0302*  
 (-1.74)  (-0.14)  (-1.70)  
SOC_DISC  -0.6974**  0.3077  -0.0475**
  (-2.24)  (0.31)  (-2.53) 
ENV_PER -0.3354*  -0.3146  -0.0300***  
 (-1.92)  (-0.76)  (-2.85)  
SOC_PER  -0.6993***  -0.0197  -0.0528*** 
  (-4.07)  (-0.05)  (-5.10) 
MTB 0.0275 0.0096 -0.1503 -0.1597 0.0049 0.0035 
 (0.24) (0.08) (-0.56) (-0.59) (0.70) (0.51) 
SIZE -8.4419** -5.9343* 46.1721*** 42.0061*** -1.2408*** -1.0669***
 (2.38) (-1.75) (5.26) (4.94) (-5.72) (-5.19) 
LEV 45.3143** 46.0302** 118.2822** 115.4392** 2.9620** 2.9660**
 (2.14) (2.19) (2.31) (2.26) (2.31) (2.43) 
ROA -129.7458*** -123.5210*** -236.2568*** -238.9591*** -9.7737*** -9.3191***
 (-4.54) (-4.34) (-3.51) (-3.54) (-5.70) (-5.47) 
CAPEX -136.7922 -162.6625* 58.7855 64.6757 -7.2194 -9.0534*
 (-1.58) (-1.89) (0.28) (0.31) (-1.38) (-1.75) 
ASST_GROW 1.2527 1.2492 -0.8352 -0.7378 0.0087 0.0081 
 (1.12) (1.13) (-0.32) (-0.28) (0.13) (0.12) 
INTERCEPT 585.5906*** 593.8031*** 717.3098*** 753.0364*** 45.2253*** 45.7634***
 (10.11) (10.86) (5.01) (5.48) (12.78) (13.77) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 
No. of firms 295 295 295 295 295 295 
R2 (%) 64.06 64.69 35.48 35.31 59.89 60.97 
This table reports random-effect panel regression estimates for the relation between environmental and social 
disclosures and financial risk. As measures of financial risk (our dependent variables), we employ the stock 
volatility (Models 1-2), CAPM beta to measure systematic risk (Models 3-4), and idiosyncratic risk from the 
CAPM (Models 5-6), respectively. All the models include industry and time fixed effects. Definitions of all 
variables are presented in Appendix A. All the coefficients reported have been multiplied by 1,000 due to variable 
scaling issues. The numbers in parentheses are t-values. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 





Table 4. Environmental and social disclosures and firm financial risk – models controlling 
for endogeneity of disclosure 
Dependent variables Stock Volatility Systematic Risk (Beta) Idiosyncratic Risk 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ENV_DISC 3.5509  -2.9970  0.2769  
 (0.65)  (-0.22)  (0.72)  
SOC_DISC  -4.1616  -5.3807  -0.3571*
  (-1.38)  (-0.39)  (-1.93) 
ENV_PER -0.9502  0.0082  -0.0594  
 (-1.31)  (0.01)  (-1.49)  
SOC_PER  -0.1375  0.5278  0.0037 
  (-0.21)  (0.30)  (0.09) 
MTB 0.0068 -0.0200 -0.1109 -0.1607 0.0029 0.0039 
 (0.05) (-0.13) (-0.39) (-0.58) (0.37) (0.39) 
SIZE -15.4351 12.0197* 65.0650 64.9430* -1.9446 0.2692 
 (-0.75) (1.71) (1.29) (1.76) (-1.37) (0.62) 
LEV 27.2299 -18.3821 69.6765 59.3682 3.1759** 0.0095 
 (1.15) (-1.02) (1.25) (0.91) (2.06) (0.01) 
ROA -113.5352***  -85.4047** -197.8566*** -173.4584** -8.4842*** -7.1595***
 (-3.26) (-2.33) (2.62) (-2.03) (-4.24) (-3.17) 
CAPEX 16.5728 248.4929*** 159.6845 208.4922 -4.8434 16.2726***
 (0.17) (3.42) (0.70) (0.79) (-0.77) (3.63) 
ASST_GROW 2.0112 0.9988 -1.3147 -1.0181  0.0636 -0.0156 
 (1.30) (0.63) (-0.37) (-0.36) (0.64) (-0.16) 
INTERCEPT 426.5915 117.6580 11.6532 62.5593 41.1083** 16.5987***
 (1.52) (1.45) (0.02) (0.08) (2.21) (3.32) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 1,681 
No. of firms 295 295 295 295 295 295 
R2 44.47 46.34 17.46 14.92 36.09 39.67 
This table reports instrumental-variable random-effect panel regression estimates for the relation between 
environmental and social disclosures and financial risk. The disclosure scores are instrumented by governance 
performance indicator and exogenous regressors included in the model specifications. As measures of financial 
risk (our dependent variables), we employ the stock volatility (Models 1-2), CAPM beta to measure systematic 
risk (Models 3-4), and idiosyncratic risk from the CAPM (Models 5-6), respectively. All the models include 
industry and time fixed effects. Definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix A. All the coefficients 
reported have been multiplied by 1,000 due to variable scaling issues. The numbers in parentheses are t-values. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
